Book Information

Book ID Asin: 0321013492
Book Title: Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
Book Author: Graham AllisonPhilip Zelikow
Book Format and Price:
Book Price: unknown
Book Category: Books, New, Used & Rental Textbooks, Humanities and unknown
Book Rating: 141 ratings

Book Product Detail

Book Review

Name: michael kelly
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: Requiredreading
Date: Reviewed in the United States on September 6, 2020
Review: It was on time and in new condition.Just like the one I bought almost 50 years ago for my American foreign policy course at the u of Minnesota, but could not find it in my basement library. I was hoping my name was in it. I got it for my Jamaican son in law who is interested in the Cold War-due to a current video game!!!!Makes me shudder to think of our current administration in such a crisis.

Name: Buce
Rating: 4.0 out of 5 stars
Title: TheGreatNonEvent
Date: Reviewed in the United States on February 8, 2004
Review: Reading "Essence of Decision" resonates with Kurosawa, or maybe Stoppard. We have a central story - one of the great non-events in human history, the moment when the Soviet Union and the United States "came eyeball to eyeball" (as Dean Rusk is said to have said) before someone blinked. We hear it three times: one, from the standpoint of the "rational actor;" second from the internal logic of organizations; and third, from the perspective of politics where people more or less rub along together.It's an event that bears retelling and, with qualification, the device works. The upshot is that we get some insight into the missile crisis. But not at all incidentally, we get some insight into the academic study of politics (I resist calling it "political science"), and a whiff of what it might have to offer for our better understanding of the world.Aside from the Kurusowa effect, there is another structural innovation. We have, in a sense, two books interleaved, like Faulkner's "Wild Palms." The even-numbered chapters tell (and retell) the basic story. The odd-numbered chapters offer a framework of "theory."I suppose you might read just the even-numbered chapters - indeed the authors themselves suggest as much, though rather half-heartedly. And indeed, the odd-numbered chapters can be heavy going. One cannot help recalling the old canard about the sociologist as a person who gets a government research grant to find the bordello next door. You are tempted to say that their theory is what sophisticated people know anyway, and the clueless will probably never figure out.But there is an answer to this dismissal. That is: most (or at least) a lot of history gets told from the standpoint of the "rational actor." A survey of the competing approaches makes it clear just what this approach leaves out. And if the polyphonic approach is so obviously superior to the single narrative line, then why have historians from Thucydides to Henry Kissinger been willing to do without it? One answer might be: for all their talents, they simply haven't learned the way to tell a story in any other way.So on the whole, retelling works. But not, perhaps, as well as it might. Another reviewer has said that this isn't really a case to illustrate "organization" theory here because this is not a case that highlights organizations - rather, at least for the United States, the response to the Cuban missile crisis was the work of a small group of men, working together in close cooperation. There is some merit to this view: concededly, you do not get the clash of bull elephants that you might have got at another time when Defense makes war on State, and both work together to fend of Intelligence. But you get a taste of it: we find that the Joint Chiefs were most hospitable to an invasion; that State thought that maybe we could talk it through; and that John McCone from the CIA was the one person who most clearly anticipated the threat. Moreover, you see the "organization" problem in a somewhat different light, when you see how the President's orders were massaged or modified by the military (sometimes, even, within the military).But perhaps in any event, I need not get too distracted by the framework. Along the way, there are any number of nuggets that stand pretty well on their own. I liked in particular, for instance, the discussion of the role of committee work. We tend to stick up our nose at any project done by committee. But, argue our authors, in World War II it was Churchill, high-handed as he was, who worked through committee-and virtually always followed the committee's advice. The "strong leader" who kept things close to his vest, was Hitler. But more generally - I was already an adult at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and I remember it well. Specifically, I remember how frightened were so many people in my surroundings. I wasn't that frightened; I figured that one way or another, we would rub along. In the end, of course, I was right - we did rub along. But I think in retrospect, it was I who was kidding myself and the Nervous Nellies who had the right attitude. We did rub along, but as Wellington said about the Battle of Waterloo, it was a near thing. I particularly like Robert Kennedy:"The fourteen people [in the American inner circle] were very significant-bright, able, dedicated people, all of whom had the greatest affection for the U.S. ... If six of them had been President of the U.S., I think that the world might have been blown up."[Final technical note: one or more of the other reviews appear to be discussing the first edition of this book. The (current) seocnd edition is not a mere cosmetic update, but substantially a new book].

Name: Vic Galfano
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: GreatbookIlearnedalotabouttheplayers
Date: Reviewed in the United States on June 10, 2016
Review: Great book - I learned a lot about the players and times. The authors evaluate three decisions (to place missiles in Cuba, to blockade and to withdraw the missiles) in terms of three theories of decision making (individual actor, as an organization and as a political outcome) all of which have implications for current issues. I would highly recommend this for both students of history and decision-making.

Name: Martin C.
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: Nothingbypraise
Date: Reviewed in the United States on February 3, 2011
Review: I have never seen the different concepts of organizational behavior put into a books this clear.A must-read for anyone who has to understand why organization end up doing what they do.A must-read for anyone interested in the missile crisis.The only nitpick is that I think the title is not chosen well. This book does so much more than what the title implies.

Name: JohnFMunro@gmail.com
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: OneoftheTopTenBooksInPoliticalScience
Date: Reviewed in the United States on December 2, 2014
Review: One of the seminal books in International Relations/Public Administration/Political Science. Illustrates how different perceptions of similar events are created by positions/locations in government. Illustrates limitations of different levels of analysis. Underscores the roots of bureaucratic behavior.

Name: Jae W. Oh, CFP
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: Incrediblebook
Date: Reviewed in the United States on August 8, 2015
Review: I cannot think of a single more important book, in any discipline, that has helped me understand another party's point of view and decision-making.It's application to real-world situations is almost without limit: incredible that even a topic as important as the Cuban Missile Crisis is almost pushed to the background.Oddly, the models of decision-making are so universal, the extra historical information added to the earlier edition, which I read decades ago, are almost a distraction. If that is a "criticism" of the book, then you can take it that way, but it is only when compared to the universality of the principles of decision-making stated.

Name: Kevin C. Rohrer
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: ExcellentRead
Date: Reviewed in the United States on March 4, 2013
Review: This is not a detailed history of the Cuban Missile Crisis; it is an overview of the Crisis from a leadership standpoint. Nevertheless, it is an excellent companion volume to any detailed history of the event you choose to read. I read this book during a grad school leadership course and thoroughly enjoyed it.

Name: BKat
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: Itisverydiscussesalotoftheoryyetiseasytounderstandandenjoy
Date: Reviewed in the United States on December 10, 2014
Review: I read this book for a class and was really dreading having to read about the cuban missile crisis...I was pleasantly surprised. Essence of Decision is really well written. It is very discusses a lot of theory yet is easy to understand and enjoy! I read it in a hurry for class, but I think I'm now going to go back and read it again for fun.

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